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Abstract
We show new connections between adversarial learning and explainability. One
form of explanation of the output of a neural network model in terms of its input
features, is a vector of feature-attributions using the Integrated Gradient (IG)
method. Two desirable characteristics of an attribution-based explanation are:
(1) sparseness: the attributions of irrelevant or weakly relevant features should
be negligible, thus resulting in concise explanations in terms of the significant
features, and (2) stability: it should not vary significantly within a small local
neighborhood of the input. For a general class of convex loss functions, we show
two new theoretical results: (a) via a novel analysis of the Stochastic Gradient
Descent process, we show that adversarial training using an `∞-bounded adversary
produces sparse models (and hence concise explanations), and (b) we show that
natural model-training while encouraging stable IG-explanations (via an extra term
in the loss function), is equivalent to adversarial training. We demonstrate the
first phenomenon in experiments training logistic regression models on a variety
of tabular toy and real-world advertising datasets: adversarial training yields
significantly sparser models, with little or no degradation in performance on natural
test data.
1 Introduction
Despite the recent dramatic success of deep learning models in a variety of domains, two concerns
have surfaced about these models:
Vulnerability to Adversarial Attacks: We can abstractly think of a neural network model as a
function F (x) of a d-dimensional input vector x ∈ Rd, and the range of F is either a discrete set
of class-labels, or a continuous value such as a probability. Many of these models can be foiled by
an adversary who imperceptibly (to humans) alters the input x by adding a perturbation δ ∈ Rd so
that F (x+δ) is very different from F (x) [1–4]. Adversarial training (or adversarial learning) has
recently been proposed as a method for training models that are robust to such attacks, by applying
techniques from the area of Robust Optimization [5, 6]. The core idea of adversarial training is
simple: we define a set S of allowed perturbations δ ∈ Rd that we want to "robustify" against (e.g. S
could be the set of δ where ||δ||∞ ≤ ε), and perform model-training using a variant of Stochastic
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Gradient Descent exactly as in natural training, except that each training example x is perturbed
adversarially, i.e. replaced by x+ δ∗ where δ∗ ∈ S maximizes the example’s loss-contribution.
Explainability: One way to address the well-known lack of explainability of deep learning models
is feature attribution, which aims to explain the output of a model F (x) as a vector AF (x) of the
contributions from the input features x. A particularly noteworthy feature-attribution technique is
the Integrated Gradients (IG) method [7], which has a number of intuitively appealing axiomatic
properties. Thus the IG-vector IGF (x) can be viewed as an explanation for F (x). For such an
explanation to be human-friendly, it is highly desirable [8] that the IG-vector is sparse, i.e., only
the features that are truly predictive of the output F (x) should have significant contributions, and
irrelevant or weakly-relevant features should have negligible contributions. A sparse attribution
makes it possible to produce a concise explanation, where only the input features with significant
contributions are included. For instance if the model F is used for a loan approval decision, then
customers, data-scientists and regulators would like to know the reason for a specific decision in
simple terms. In practice however, due to artifacts in the training data, the IG-vector is often not
sparse, and irrelevant or weakly-relevant features end up having significant contributions [9]. Another
desirable property of a good explanation is stability: the IG-vector should not vary significantly
within a small local neighborhood of the input x. Similar to the lack of concise explainability, natural
training often results in explanations that lack stability [10].
This paper shows new connections between adversarial robustness and the above-mentioned aspects
of explainability, namely conciseness and stability of explanations.
Our first set of results demonstrate that adversarial training produces sparse models (which in turn
leads to concise explanations). To show this we present a novel analysis of the expectation of the
weight-change of a feature during an SGD step on a randomly drawn, adversarially perturbed data
point (Sec. 3). In particular we show (Theorem 3.1) that for a general class of convex loss functions
(which includes popular loss functions like logistic and hinge loss), and adversarial perturbations δ
satisfying ||δ||∞ ≤ ε, the weights of "weak" features are on average more aggressively shrunk toward
zero than during natural training, and the rate of shrinkage is proportional to the amount by which ε
exceeds a certain measure of the "strength" of the feature.
In Section 6 and in the Supplement, we empirically show this phenomenon in several experiments
on tabular datasets (including real-world advertising datasets), in the context of learning logistic
regression models. In all of our experiments, we find that it is possible to choose an `∞ bound
ε so that adversarial learning under this bound produces sparse models with little or no drop in
performance on natural test data. Moreover, for the above class of loss functions, we show that there
is a simple closed form formula for the worst-case adversarial perturbation δ∗. These results imply an
extremely simple and efficient way to produce sparse models without impacting natural accuracy: use
`∞(ε)-adversarial training with a suitable ε. By contrast, previous methods to train sparse logistic
regression models (e.g. [9, 11]) require specially implemented optimization procedures.
Secondly, we show a closed form formula for the IG-vector for any 1-layer neural network with an
arbitrary differentiable activation function (Sec. 4). This closed form formula enables very efficient
computation of the IG vector for a specific example, as well as an "aggregate" IG vector over an
entire dataset. Aggregate IG vectors help illuminate the overall importance of features.
Finally, we show theoretically (Sec. 5) that training 1-layer networks naturally, while encouraging
stability of explanations (via a suitable term added to the loss function), is in fact equivalent to
adversarial training.
Remark. Although our theoretical results in Sections 3 and 5 are stated in terms of loss functions
that are typically used to train 1-layer networks (e.g. Logistic or Poisson regression), it is also
possible to think of the input vector x as representing the activations at the penultimate layer of a
deep network – in other words x could either represent "raw" input features in a 1-layer network,
or "derived" features in a deep network ([12, 13] take a similar viewpoint). For example one can
imagine a transfer learning scenario where the network up to the penultimate layer x is "frozen", and
the weights of the final layer are learned.
2
2 Setup and Assumptions
We assume there is a distribution D of data points (x, y) where x ∈ Rd is an input feature vector,
and y ∈ {±1} is its true label1. For each i ∈ [d], the i’th component of x represents an input feature,
and is denoted by xi. The model is assumed to have learnable parameters ("weights")w ∈ Rd, and
for a given data point (x, y), the loss is given by some function L(x, y;w). Natural model training 2
consists of minimizing the expected loss, known as empirical risk:
E(x,y)∼D[L(x, y;w)]. (1)
We sometimes assume the existence of an `∞(ε)-adversary who may perturb the input example x by
adding a vector δ ∈ Rd whose `∞-norm is bounded by ε; such a perturbation δ is referred to as an
`∞(ε)-perturbation. For a given data point (x, y) and a given loss functionL(.), an `∞(ε)-adversarial
perturbation is a δ∗ that maximizes the adversarial loss L(x+δ∗, y;w).
The aim of adversarial training[5] is to train a model that is robust to an `∞(ε)-adversary (i.e.
performs well in the presence of such an adversary), and consists of minimizing the expected
`∞(ε)-adversarial loss:
E(x,y)∼D[ max||δ||∞≤ε
L(x+δ, y;w)]. (2)
In the expectations (1) and (2) we often drop the subscript under E when it is clear that the expectation
is over (x, y) ∼ D.
For various theoretical results we will make certain assumptions regarding the form and properties of
the loss function, the properties of its first derivative, and the data distribution. We highlight these
assumptions (with mnemonic names) here for ease of future reference.
Assumption LOSS-INC. The loss function is of the form L(x, y;w) = g(−y〈w,x〉) where g is a
non-decreasing function.
Assumption LOSS-CVX. The loss function is of the form L(x, y;w) = g(−y〈w,x〉) where g is
non-decreasing, almost-everywhere differentiable, and convex.
Section B.1 in the Supplement shows that these Assumptions are satisfied by popular loss functions
such as logistic and hinge loss. Incidentally, note that for any differentiable function g, g is convex
if and only if its first-derivative g′ is non-decreasing, and we will use this property in some of the
proofs.
Assumption FEAT-INDEP. The features x are conditionally independent given the label y, i.e. for
any two distinct indices i, j, xi is independent of xj given y, or more compactly, (xi ⊥ xj) | y.
This Assumption is used to prove Theorem 3.1 in the next Section, and is not as restrictive as it may
first appear: one can imagine clustering features into groups that are conditionally independent of
each other (given the label y), and extend our results to such clustered features; we leave this for
future work.
Assumption FEAT-EXP. For each feature xi, i ∈ [d], E(xi|y) = aiy for some constant ai.
In Section B.2 (Supplement) we show that Assumption FEAT-EXP is without loss of generality, and
it is worth observing that this Assumption implies
E(yxi) = E[E(yxi|y)] = E[yE(xi|y)] = E[y2ai] = ai, (3)
where the last equality is due to the fact that y ∈ {±1}. Similarly,
E(yxi|y) = yE[xi|y] = y2ai = ai. (4)
Note that for any j, the expectation E(yxj) can be thought of as representing the degree of associa-
tion3 between feature xj and label y. When the data distribution satisfies Assumption FEAT-EXP,
E(yxj) = aj , so we refer to aj as the directed strength 4 of feature xj , and |aj | is referred to as the
absolute strength of xj . In particular when |aj | is large (small) we say that xj is a strong (weak)
feature.
1It is trivial to convert -1/1 labels to 0/1 labels and vice versa
2Also referred to as standard training by [5]
3When the features are standardized to have mean 0, E(yxj) is in fact the covariance of y and xj .
4This is related to the feature "robustness" notion introduced in [12]
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3 Analysis of SGD Updates in Adversarial Training
One of the main results of this work is a theoretical characterization of the weight updates during a
single SGD step, when applied to a randomly drawn data point (x, y) ∼ D that is subjected to an
`∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation. As a preliminary, it is easy to show the following expressions related
to the `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation δ∗ (See Lemmas 2 and 3 in Section C of the Supplement): For
loss functions satisfying Assumption LOSS-INC, the `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation δ∗ is given by:
δ∗ = −y sgn(w)ε, (5)
the corresponding `∞(ε)-adversarial loss is
L(x+δ∗, y; w) = g(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉), (6)
and the gradient of this loss w.r.t. a weight wi is
∂L(x+δ∗, y; w)
∂wi
= −g′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w,x〉) (yxi − sgn(wi)ε). (7)
In our main result, the expectation of the g′ term in (7) plays an important role, so we will use the
following notation:
g′ := E
[
g′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w,x〉)
]
(8)
Ideally, we would like to understand the nature of the weight-vectorw∗ that minimizes the expected
adversarial loss (2). This is quite challenging, so rather than analyzing the final optimum of (2), we
instead analyze how an SGD-based optimizer for (2) updates the model weightsw. We assume an
idealized SGD process: (a) a data point (x, y) is drawn from distribution D, (b) x is replaced by
x′ = x+δ∗ where δ∗ is an `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation with respect to the loss function L, (c)
each weight wi is updated by an amount ∆wi = −∂L(x′, y;w)/∂wi (assuming a unit learning rate
to avoid notational clutter). We are interested in the expectation of ∆wi, in order to understand what
happens to a weight wi on average during a single SGD step. In fact it will be useful to analyze the
expected SGD update ∆wi defined as follows:
∆wi :=
{
−E ∂L∂wi , when wi = 0,
− sgn(wi)E ∂L∂wi , when wi 6= 0,
(9)
When wi 6= 0, a positive (negative) ∆wi indicates that during an SGD update on a randomly
chosen data-point, on average the weight wi expands (shrinks), i.e. maintains its sign and increases
(decreases) in absolute value.
The following result characterizes ∆wi (the proof is in Section D of the Supplement).
Theorem 3.1 (Expected SGD Update in Adversarial Training). For any loss function L satisfying
Assumption LOSS-CVX and a data distribution D satisfying Assumptions FEAT-INDEP and FEAT-
EXP, if a data point (x, y) is randomly drawn from D, and x is perturbed to x′ = x+δ∗, where δ∗ is
an `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation, then under the `∞(ε)-adversarial loss L(x′, y;w), the expected
SGD-update of weight wi, namely ∆wi, satisfies the following properties:
1. If wi = 0, then
∆wi = g′ ai. (10)
2. If wi 6= 0, then
∆wi ≤ g′ [ai sgn(wi)− ε], (11)
and equality holds in the limit as wi approaches zero,
where ai = E(xiy) is the directed strength of feature xi from Assumption FEAT-EXP, and g′ is the
expectation in (8).
3.1 Implications of Theorem 3.1
Note that aj sgn(wj) > 0 signifies that the sign of the weight wj agrees with the directed strength aj
of feature xj , and for brevity we simply say that weightwj is aligned. Conversely when aj sgn(wj) <
0 we say that weight wj is mis-aligned. With these observations in mind Theorem 3.1 implies the
following:
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Weights grow from zero in the correct direction. When wi = 0, the expected SGD update ∆wi
is proportional to the directed strength ai of feature xi, and if g′ 6= 0, this means that on average the
SGD update causes the weight wi to grow from zero in the correct direction. This is what one would
expect from an SGD training procedure.
Mis-aligned weights wi shrink at a rate proportional to ε + |ai|. When wi 6= 0, if wi is mis-
aligned, i.e. ai sgn(wi) < 0, the upper bound in (11) is non-positive, and this means the expected
SGD update is non-positive, and the weight wi shrinks on average. Thus, mis-aligned weights shrink
on average, at a rate proportional to the `∞ adversarial bound ε plus the absolute feature strength.
In other words, all other factors remaining the same, adversarial training (i.e. with ε > 0) shrinks
mis-aligned faster than natural training (i.e. with ε = 0).
If wi is aligned, and ε > |ai| then it shrinks at a rate proportional to ε − |ai|. What happens
when a non-zero weight wi is aligned, i.e. ai sgn(wi) > 0? In this case if ε > |ai|, then the
upper-bound (11) on the expected SGD update is once again negative (assuming g′ 6= 0), which
means adversarial training with a sufficiently large ε that dominates the absolute strength of a feature
will cause the weight of that feature to shrink on average. This observation is key to explaining the
"feature-pruning" behavior of adversarial training: "weak" features (relative to ε) are weeded out by
the SGD updates.
If wi is aligned, and ε < |ai|, then wi expands up to a certain point. If a non-zero weight wi is
aligned and ε < |ai|, then the upper bound (11) on ∆wi is non-negative. Since the Theorem states
that equality holds in the limit as wi approaches zero, this means if |wi| is sufficiently small, the
expected SGD update ∆wi is non-negative, i.e., the weight wi expands on average. In other words,
weights of aligned features expand on average up to a certain point, if ε does not dominate their
strength.
Note that Assumption LOSS-CVX implies that g′ ≥ 0, and when the model w is "far" from the
optimum, the values of −y〈w, x〉 will tend to be large, and since g′ is a non-decreasing function
(Assumption LOSS-CVX), g′ will be large as well. So we can interpret g′ as being a proxy for
"average model error". Thus during the initial iterations of SGD, this quantity will tend to be large
and positive, and shrinks toward zero as the model approaches optimality. Since g′ appears as a factor
in (10) and (11), we can conclude that the above effects will be more pronounced in the initial stages
of SGD and less so in the later stages. The experimental results described in Section 6 and in Sections
I, J of the Supplement are consistent with several of the above effects.
4 Feature Attribution using Integrated Gradients
Theorem 3.1 showed that `∞(ε)-adversarial training tends to shrink the weights of features that
are "weak" (relative to ε). We now show a link between weights and explanations, specifically
explanations in the form of a vector of feature-attributions given by the Integrated Gradients (IG)
method [7], which is defined as follows: Suppose F : Rd → R is a real-valued function of an
input vector. For example F could represent the output of a neural network, or even a loss function
L(x, y;w) when the label y and weightsw are held fixed. Let x ∈ Rd be a specific input, and u ∈ Rd
be a baseline input. The IG is defined as the path integral of the gradients along the straight-line path
from the baseline u to the input x. The IG along the i’th dimension for an input x and baseline u is
defined as:
IGFi (x,u; w) := (xi − ui)×
∫ 1
α=0
∂iF (u+α(x−u))dα, (12)
where ∂iF (z) denotes the gradient of F (v) along the i’th dimension, at v = z . The vector of all IG
components IGFi (x,u; w) is denoted as IG
F (x,u; w).
For general neural networks F , the authors of [7] show that the IG attribution method satisfies a
number of intuitively appealing properties that any reasonable attribution method should satisfy.
They further show how to approximate the IG integral (12) by a summation involving gradients at
m equally-spaced points along the straight-line path from the baseline input u to the actual input x.
While this approximation is reasonably efficient for a fixed example x and dimension i, it can be
prohibitively expensive for computing the IG values across a dataset of millions of examples and
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thousands of (sparse) features. A closed form expression for the IG would therefore be of significant
interest, especially if the goal is to compute the IG over an entire dataset in order to glean aggregate
feature importances. As we see below and in Section 5, such an expression also makes it easier to
prove useful theoretical results.
The following Lemma (proved in Sec. E of the Supplement) shows a closed form exact expression
for the IGF (x,u; w) when F (x) is of the form
F (x) = A(〈w, x〉), (13)
wherew ∈ Rd is a vector of weights, A is a differentiable scalar-valued function, and 〈w, x〉 denotes
the dot product ofw and x. Note that this form of F could represent a single-layer neural network with
any differentiable activation function (e.g., logistic (sigmoid) activation A(z) = 1/[1 + exp(−z)]
or Poisson activation A(z) = exp(z)), or a differentiable loss function, such as those that satisfy
Assumption LOSS-INC for a fixed label y and weight-vector w. For brevity, we will refer to a
function of the form (13) as representing a "1-Layer Network", with the understanding that it could
equally well represent a suitable loss function.
Lemma 4.1 (IG Attribution for 1-layer Networks). If F (x) is computed by a 1-layer network (13)
with weights vectorw, then the Integrated Gradients for all dimensions of x relative to a baseline u
are given by:
IGF (x,u; w) = [F (x)− F (u)] (x−u)w〈x−u, w〉 , (14)
where the  operator denotes the entry-wise product of vectors.
From this result it is clear that if the weight-vector w is sparse, then the IG vector will also be
correspondingly sparse. Theorem 3.1 suggests that `∞(ε)-adversarial training tends to shrink "weak"
features (even if their weights are "aligned", as we saw in Section 3.1). This is in fact what we see
in the experimental results (Section 6): real-world tabular datasets often tend to have several such
weak features, and `∞(ε)-adversarial training (with a suitably chosen ε) of logistic regression models
results in a sparse weight-vector, and hence a sparse IG vector as well.
5 Training with Explanation Stability is equivalent to Adversarial Training
Suppose we use the IG method described in Sec. 4 as an explanation for the output of a model F (x)
on a specific input x. A desirable property of an explainable model is that the explanation for the
value of F (x) is stable[10], i.e., does not change much under small perturbations of the input x. One
way to formalize this is to say the following worst-case `1-norm of the change in IG should be small:
max
x′∈N(x,ε)
|| IGF (x′,u; w)− IGF (x,u; w)||1, (15)
where N(x, ε) denotes a suitable ε-neighborhood of x, and u is an appropriate baseline input vector.
If the model F is a single-layer neural network, it would be a function of 〈w, x〉 for some weights
w, and typically when training such networks the loss is a function of 〈w, x〉 as well, so we would
not change the essence of (15) much if instead of F in each IG, we use L(x, y;w) for a fixed y;
let us denote this function by Ly. Also intuitively, || IGLy (x′,u;w)− IGLy (x,u;w)||1 is not too
different from || IGLy (x′,x;w)||1. These observations motivate the following definition of Stable-IG
Empirical Risk, which is a modification of the usual empirical risk (1), with a regularizer to encourage
stable IG explanations:
E(x,y)∼D
[L(x, y;w) + max
||x′−x ||∞≤ε
|| IGLy (x,x′; w)||1
]
. (16)
The following somewhat surprising result is proved in Section F of the Supplement.
Theorem 5.1 (Equivalence of Stable IG and Adversarial Robustness). For loss functions L(x, y;w)
satisfying Assumption LOSS-CVX, the augmented loss inside the expectation (16) equals the `∞(ε)-
adversarial loss inside the expectation (2), i.e.
L(x, y;w) + max
||x′−x ||∞≤ε
|| IGLy (x,x′; w)||1 = max||δ||∞≤εL(x+δ, y;w) (17)
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This implies that for loss functions satisfying Assumption LOSS-CVX, minimizing the Stable-IG
Empirical Risk (16) is equivalent to minimizing the expected `∞(ε)-adversarial loss. In other words,
for this class of loss functions, natural model training while encouraging IG stability is equivalent
to `∞(ε)-adversarial training! Combined with Theorem 3.1 and the corresponding experimental
results in Sec 6, this equivalence implies that, for this class of loss functions, and data distributions
satisfying Assumption FEAT-INDEP, the explanations for the models produced by `∞(ε)-adversarial
training are both concise (due to the sparseness of the models), and stable.
6 Experiments
Based on the implications of Theorem 3.1 discussed in Section 3.1, we conjectured that for loss
functions satisfying Assumption LOSS-CVX, `∞(ε)-adversarial training using SGD (with a suitable
value of ε) can effectively act as an aggressive "relevance filter", weeding out the weights of features
that are irrelevant or "weak" (relative to ε), even when the data distribution does not strictly satisfy
Assumption FEAT-INDEP as required in the proof of that Theorem. We put this conjecture to the test
by applying `∞(ε)-adversarial training to logistic regression models for binary probability prediction
tasks, where the output of the model F (x) is to be interpreted as the predicted probability that the
label y is 1. We used the Logistic Loss, which satisfies Assumption LOSS-CVX (see Supplement,
Section B.1). For such loss functions, the `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation (5) is applied to the input
examples, after 1-hot-encoding all categorical variables.
Specifically, we ran experiments on several tabular datasets: toy datasets from the UCI Data Reposi-
tory [14], and real world advertising datasets from MediaMath. Our experiments confirm the above
conjecture: In all cases, we found that it is possible to chose ε from a certain goldilocks zone of
"good" values that simultaneously achieves two desirable effects: (a) the feature-weight vector of the
resulting models is significantly more sparse compared to natural training (i.e., with ε = 0), and this
effect is much more pronounced in the large-scale real-world Advertising dataset from MediaMath,
as we see below; (b) compared to natural training, there is little or no impact on performance on
natural test data, as measured by the AUC-ROC metric.
In the MediaMath experiments, we trained logistic regression models on advertising campaign
datasets, to predict the probability of positive response to an ad. A given campaign dataset can
have as many as 50 million examples, and 400,000 sparse features (due to the presence of several
high-cardinality categorical attributes). Given the high dimensionality of the feature-space, it is of
considerable practical importance to understand which features have a truly significant impact on the
predictions. Figure 1 summarizes results on 6 anonymized campaigns. Results from experiments
on the UCI datasets, as well as more details on the MediaMath experiments, are in the Supplement
(Sections I, J). We have also made our code available in the Supplement.
7 Related Work
In contrast to the growing body of work on defenses against adversarial attacks [15, 5, 4] or explaining
adversarial examples [2, 16], the focus of our paper is the connection between adversarial robustness
and explainability. We view the process of adversarial training as a tool to produce more explainable
models. A recent series of papers [16, 12] essentially argues that adversarial examples exist because
standard training produces models that are heavily reliant on highly predictive but non-robust features
(which is similar to our notion of "weak" features in Sec 3.1) which are vulnerable to an adversary
who can "flip" them and cause performance to degrade. This viewpoint would seem to imply a
necessary tradeoff between adversarial robustness and standard accuracy (i.e. performance on natural
test data). In fact [16] constructs a synthetic dataset where this tradeoff can be forced: As adversarial
accuracy approaches 100%, standard accuracy drops significantly. Nevertheless, our results on
tabular real-world and toy UCI datasets show that it is possible to use `∞(ε)-adversarial training
to produce models whose standard performance (as measured by AUC-ROC) is on par with that of
naturally-trained models, with the added benefit that the weights of weak or irrelevant features have
been pruned significantly, and such models lend themselves to more human-friendly and faithful
explanations. Indeed the authors of [12] touch upon some connections between explainability and
robustness, and conclude, "As such, producing human-meaningful explanations that remain faithful
to underlying models cannot be pursued independently from the training of the models themselves",
by which they are implying that good explainability may require intervening in the model-training
7
procedure itself; this is consistent with our findings. Another recent related paper [17] analyzes the
effect of adversarial training on the interpretability of neural network loss gradients. We discuss other
related work in the Supplement Section A.
Figure 1: Top Left: Comparison of AUC-ROC and feature-concentration (W1P) between natural
("nat") and adversarial ("adv") training on 6 advertising campaigns. W1P is the percent of feature
weights whose absolute value is at least 1% of the highest absolute weight. In all cases, adversarial
training substantially improves W1P with minimal impact on AUC. The other 3 figures refer to
campaign 735. Bottom Left: Comparison of drop-off of absolute feature weights in natural and
adversarial training (ε = 0.01). In each curve, a point (p, w) indicates that p percent of the absolute
weights are larger than w. Each curve is truncated when the absolute weight reaches 1% of the highest
absolute weight in the respective model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper absolute
weight drop-off, with only 0.5% of the absolute weights being above the 1% threshold, compared to
12% with natural training. Top Right: Variation of AUC and W1P with `∞(ε)-adversarial training,
as ε is increased. Notice that for ε values in the blue vertical band (the "goldilocks zone"), W1P is
sharply lower than with natural training (ε = 0) and yet AUC remains within 0.01 of the naturally
trained AUC (green horizontal band). Bottom Right: Variation of AUC, W1P with natural training,
as the L1-regularization strength λ is varied. Notice that as λ increases, before the AUC degrades
significantly, the drop in W1P is significantly less compared to `∞(ε)-adversarial training.
8 Conclusion
We presented theoretical and experimental results that show a strong connection between adversarial
robustness (under `∞-bounded perturbations) and two desirable properties of model explanations:
conciseness and stability. On the theory side we showed two properties of `∞-bounded adversarial
training, for a general class of convex loss functions: (a) it tends to aggressively prune the weights
of marginally-relevant features (when the features are conditionally independent given the label),
thus yielding concise explanations, and (b) it is equivalent to natural training with a loss function
that encourages local stability of the IG vector. We presented extensive experiments that demonstrate
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the "feature-pruning" benefits of adversarial training on real-world tabular data-sets, and found no
appreciable loss in performance on natural test data. For 1-layer networks we also showed a simple
closed form formula for the feature-attribution vector based on Integrated Gradients (IG).
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[Code for the experiments is available at https://github.com/Ombray/advex]
Appendix A Additional Related Work
Section 7 discussed some of the work most directly related to this paper. Here we describe some
additional related work.
Relation to work on Regularization Benefits of AML. There has been prior work on the regular-
ization benefits of adversarial training [18, 1, 2, 19–21], primarily in image-classification applications:
when a model is adversarially trained, its classification accuracy on natural (i.e. un-perturbed) test
data can improve. All of this prior work has focused on the performance-improvement (on natural
test data) aspect of regularization, but none have examined the feature-pruning benefits explicitly. In
contrast to this work, our primary interest is in the explainability benefits of adversarial training, and
specifically the ability of adversarial training to significantly improve feature-concentration while
maintaining (and often improving) performance on natural test data.
Tabular datasets vs traditional adversarial ML research domains. Although our theoretical
analysis (Theorem 3.1) is generally applicable to any type of dataset as long as the assumptions
required by the theorem (namely, LOSS-CVX, FEAT-INDEP) are satisfied, our experimental results
are only on tabular datasets (as opposed to images, audio or text). We focus on such datasets here
because loss functions that satisfy Assumption LOSS-CVX are typically used in training 1-layer
neural network models, and the most common such model is logistic regression. Logistic regression
models (and variants such a Poisson regression) have been successfully used primarily on tabular
datasets, in a variety of domains such as advertising [22, 23], health-care [24–27], and finance
[28–31]. In all of these domains, it is crucial to understand which input features are truly important
in determining the model’s output (either on a single data point or in aggregate across a dataset),
and our aim is to show that adversarially-trained logistic regression models yield significantly better
feature-attribution by shrinking the weights on irrelevant or weakly-relevant features to negligible
levels, with minimal impact on (and often improvement in) performance on natural test data.
Adversarial Training vs `1-regularization. It might be argued that traditional `1-regularization
can potentially also provide a similar explainability benefit by shrinking the weights of irrelevant
features. This does seem to hold for the toy UCI datasets (Supplement Sec. I) with simple opti-
mizers such as pure SGD (Stochastic Gradient Descent). However practitioners typically use more
sophisticated optimizers such as FTRL [22] to achieve better model performance on test data, and
with this optimizer (especially on the real-world advertising data, as described in Sec. J of the
Supplement) the model-concentration produced by adversarial training is significantly better than
with `1-regularization (and `2-regularization is even worse than `1-regularization in this respect).
Moreover, `1 or `2 regularization will not necessarily yield the robustness guarantees provided by
adversarial training [2]. In other words adversarial training simultaneously provides robustness
to adversarial attacks, as well as explainability benefits, while maintaining or improving model
performance on natural test data. These advantages make adversarial training especially compelling
for logistic regression models since there is a simple closed form formula (5) for the adversarial
perturbation in this case, and so from a computational standpoint it is no more demanding than `1 or
`2 regularization.
Adversarial Training vs Feature-Selection. Since our results show that adversarial training can
effectively shrink the weights of irrelevant or weakly-relevant features (while preserving weights
on relevant features), a legitimate counter-proposal might be that one could weed out such features
beforehand via a pre-processing step where features with negligible label-correlations can be "re-
moved" from the training process. Besides the fact that this scheme has no guarantees whatsoever
with regard to adversarial robustness, there are some practical reasons why correlation-based feature
selection is not as effective as adversarial training, in producing pruned models: (a) With adversarial
training, one needs to simply try different values of the adversarial strength parameter ε and find a
level where accuracy (or other metric such as AUC-ROC) is not impacted much but model-weights
are significantly more concentrated; on the other hand with the correlation-based feature-pruning
method, one needs to set up an iterative loop with gradually increasing correlation thresholds, and
each time the input pre-processing pipeline needs to be re-executed with a reduced set of features. (b)
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When there are categorical features with large cardinalities, where just some of the categorical values
have negligible feature-correlations, it is not even clear how one can "remove" these specific feature
values, since the feature itself must still be used; at the very least it would require a re-encoding of the
categorical feature each time a subset of its values is "dropped" (for example if a one-hot encoding or
hashing scheme is used). Thus correlation-based feature-pruning is a much more cumbersome and
inefficient process compared to adversarial training.
Adversarial Training vs Other Methods to Train Sparse Logistic Regression Models. [9, 11]
propose an approach to train sparse logistic regression models based on a min-max optimization
problem that can be solved by the cutting plane algorithm. This requires a specially implemented
custom optimization procedure. By contrast, `∞(ε)-adversarial training can be implemented as a
simple and efficient "bolt-on" layer on top of existing ML pipelines based on TensorFlow, PyTorch
or SciKit-Learn, which makes it highly practical. Another paper [32] proposes a feature selection
procedure based on penalized maximum likelihood with a complexity penalty on the model size, but
once again this requires special-purpose optimization code.
Appendix B Discussion of Assumptions
B.1 Loss Functions Satisfying Assumption LOSS-CVX
We show here that several popular loss functions satisfy the Assumption LOSS-CVX.
Logistic NLL Loss.
L(x, y;w) = − ln(σ(y〈w, x〉)) = ln(1 + exp(−〈w, x〉)), which can be written as g(−y〈w, x〉)
where g(z) = (1 + ez) is a non-decreasing and convex function.
Hinge Loss
L(x, y;w) = (1 − y〈w, x〉)+, which can be written as g(−〈w, x〉) where g(z) = (1 + z)+ is
non-decreasing and convex.
Softplus Hinge Loss.
L(x, y;w) = ln(1 + exp(1− y〈w, x〉)), which can be written as g(−y〈w, x〉) where g(z) = ln(1 +
e1+z), and clearly g is non-decreasing. Moreover the first derivative of g, g′(z) = 1/(1 + e−1−z) is
non-decreasing, and therefore g is convex.
B.2 Assumption FEAT-EXP is without loss of generality
While Assumption FEAT-EXP may seem restrictive, we show that there is in fact no loss of generality
in making this assumption, when there are only two possible values of the label.
Lemma 1 (Form of conditional expectation ofX given Y when Y ∈ {±1}). Given random variables
X,Y where Y ∈ {±1}, E(X|Y ) must be of the form:
E(X|Y ) = aY + c (B.18)
where
a = [E(X|Y = 1)− E(X|Y = −1)]/2 (B.19)
and
c = [E(X|Y = 1) + E(X|Y = −1)]/2 (B.20)
This implies that the random variable X ′ = X − c satisfies E(X ′|Y ) = aY .
Proof. Consider the function f(Y ) = E(X|Y ), and let b0 := f(−1) and b1 := f(1). Since there are
only two values of Y that are of interest, we can represent f(Y ) by a linear function aY + c, and it
is trivial to verify that a = (b1 − b0)/2 and c = (b1 + b0)/2 are the unique values that are consistent
with f(−1) = b0 and f(1) = b1.
A consequence of this Lemma is that a dataset can be transformed into one satisfying Assumption
FEAT-EXP by a simple translation of each xi to a new feature
x′i = xi − 0.5 ∗ [E(xi|y = 1) + E(xi|y = −1)]. (B.21)
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Appendix C Expressions for adversarial perturbation and loss-gradient
We show two simple preliminary results for loss functions that satisfy Assumption LOSS-INC:
Lemma 2 shows a simple closed form expression for the `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation, and we use
this result to derive an expression for the gradient of the `∞(ε)-adversarial loss L(x+δ∗, y;w) with
respect to a weight wi (Lemma 3).
Lemma 2 (Closed form for `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation). For a data point (x, y), given model
weights w, if the loss function L(x, y;w) satisfies Assumption LOSS-INC, the `∞(ε)-adversarial
perturbation δ∗ is given by:
δ∗ = −y sgn(w)ε, (5)
and the corresponding `∞(ε)-adversarial loss is
L(x+δ∗, y; w) = g(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉) (6)
Proof. Assumption LOSS-INC implies that the loss is non-increasing in y〈w, x〉, and therefore the
`∞(ε)-perturbation δ∗ of x that maximizes the loss would be such that, for each i ∈ [d], xi is changed
by an amount ε in the direction of −y sgn(wi), and the result immediately follows.
Lemma 3 (Gradient of adversarial loss). For any loss function satisfying Assumption LOSS-INC, for
a given data point (x, y), the gradient of the `∞(ε)-adversarial loss is given by:
∂L(x+δ∗, y; w)
∂wi
= −g′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w,x〉) (yxi − sgn(wi)ε) (7)
Proof. This is straightforward by substituting the expression (5) for δ∗ in g(−y〈w,x+δ∗〉), and
applying the chain rule.
Appendix D Expectation of SGD Weight Update
The following Lemma will be used to prove Theorem 3.1.
D.1 Upper bound on E[Zf(Z, V )]
Lemma 4 (Upper Bound on expectation of Zf(Z, V ) when f is non-increasing in Z, (Z ⊥ V )|Y ,
and E(Z|Y ) = E(Z)). For any random variables Z, V , if:
• f(Z, V ) is non-increasing in Z,
• Z, V are conditionally independent given a third r.v. Y , and
• E(Z|Y ) = E(Z),
then
E[Zf(Z, V )] ≤ E(Z)E[f(Z, V )] (D.22)
Proof. Let z = E(Z) = E(Z|Y ) and note that
E[Zf(Z, V )]− E[Z]E[f(Z, V )] = E[Zf(Z, V )]− zE[f(Z, V )] (D.23)
= E[(Z − z)f(Z, V )] (D.24)
We want to now argue that E[(Z − z)f(z, V )] = 0. To see this, apply the Law of Total Expectation
by conditioning on Y :
E[(Z − z)f(z, V )] = E
[
E
[
(Z − z)f(z, V )|Y ]]
= E
[
E
[
(Z − z)|Y ]E[f(z, V )|Y ]] (since (Z ⊥ V )|Y ) (D.25)
= 0. (since E(Z|Y ) = E(Z) = z) (D.26)
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Since E[(Z − z)f(z, V )] = 0, we can subtract it from the last expectation in (D.24), and by linearity
of expectations the RHS of (D.24) can be replaced by
E
[
(Z − z)(f(Z, V )− f(z, V ))]. (D.27)
That fact that f(Z, V ) is non-increasing in Z implies that (Z − z)(f(Z, V )− f(z, V )) ≤ 0 for any
value of Z and V , with equality when Z = z. Therefore the expectation (D.27) is bounded above by
zero, which implies the desired result.
Theorem 3.1 (Expected SGD Update in Adversarial Training). For any loss function L satisfying
Assumption LOSS-CVX and a data distribution D satisfying Assumptions FEAT-INDEP and FEAT-
EXP, if a data point (x, y) is randomly drawn from D, and x is perturbed to x′ = x+δ∗, where δ∗ is
an `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation, then under the `∞(ε)-adversarial loss L(x′, y;w), the expected
SGD-update of weight wi, namely ∆wi, satisfies the following properties:
1. If wi = 0, then
∆wi = g′ ai. (10)
2. If wi 6= 0, then
∆wi ≤ g′ [ai sgn(wi)− ε], (11)
and equality holds in the limit as wi approaches zero,
where ai = E(xiy) is the directed strength of feature xi from Assumption FEAT-EXP, and g′ is the
expectation in (8).
Proof. Consider the adversarial loss gradient expression (7) from Lemma 3. For the case wi = 0, the
negative expectation of the adversarial loss gradient is
∆wi = E
[
yxi g
′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉)
]
= E
[
E
[
yxi g
′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉) |y
]]
= E
[
y E
[
xi g
′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉) |y
]]
,
and in the last expectation above, we note that since wi = 0 the argument of g′ does not depend on
xi, and by Assumption FEAT-INDEP the features are conditionally independent given y, so the inner
conditional expectation can be factored as a product of conditional expectations, which gives
∆wi = E
[
yE(xi|y)E
[
g′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉) |y
]]
= E
[
y2aiE
[
g′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉) |y
]]
(due to Assumption FEAT-EXP)
= aiE
[
E
[
g′(ε||w ||1 − y〈w, x〉) |y
]]
.(since y = ±1)
= aig′, (D.28)
which establishes the first result.
Now consider the case wi 6= 0. Starting with the adversarial loss gradient expression (7) from Lemma
3, multiplying throughout by − sgn(wi) and taking expectations results in
∆wi = E
[[
yxi sgn(wi)− ε
]
g′(ε||w||1 − y〈w, x〉)
]
(D.29)
where the expectation is with respect to a random choice of data-point (x, y). The argument of g′ can
be written as
ε||w||1 − y〈w, x〉 = −
d∑
j=1
|wj |(yxj sgn(wj)− ε).
For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} if we let Zj denote the random variable corresponding to yxjsgn(wj) − ε,
then the expectation (D.30) can be written as
E
Zi g′
− d∑
j=1
|wj |Zj
 = E [Zi g′ (V − |wi|Zi)] , (D.30)
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where the random variable V denotes the negative sum of the |wj |Zj terms over all j except j = i.
Note that the last expectation above is with respect to the distribution of three random variables: Zi,
V , and the random variable Y corresponding to the label y of the data point. Since Zi is a function of
feature xi and Y , and V is a function of the remaining features and Y , Assumption FEAT-INDEP
(the features xj are conditionally independent given the label Y ) implies (V ⊥ Zi)|Y . Moreover (3)
and (4) imply that
E(Zi) = E(Zi|Y ) = ai sgn(wi)− ε. (D.31)
Since by Assumption LOSS-CVX, g′ is a non-decreasing function, g′(V − |wi|Zi) is non-increasing
in Zi. Thus all three conditions of Lemma 4 are satisfied, with the random variables Z, V, Y and
function f in the Lemma corresponding to random variables Zi, V, Y and function g′ respectively in
the present Theorem. It then follows from Lemma 4 that
∆wi ≤ E(Zi)g′ (D.32)
= g′[ai sgn(wi)− ε], (D.33)
which establishes the upper bound (11) for any wi 6= 0. Now consider a wi 6= 0 that is infinitesimally
close to 0. In this case ∆wi equals the RHS of (D.30), and if we let |wi| approach zero,
∆wi = E[Zig′(V )] = E
[
E[Zig′(V )|Y ]
]
= E
[
E[Zi|Y ]E[g′(V )|Y ]
]
, (D.34)
where the last equality follows from the conditional independence of Zi and V given Y . Using (D.31)
the last expectation above simplifies to (ai sgn(wi)− ε)g′, which establishes the equality result for
non-zero infinitesimally small wi.
Appendix E Proof of Lemma 4.1
Lemma 4.1 (IG Attribution for 1-layer Networks). If F (x) is computed by a 1-layer network (13)
with weights vectorw, then the Integrated Gradients for all dimensions of x relative to a baseline u
are given by:
IGF (x,u; w) = [F (x)− F (u)] (x−u)w〈x−u, w〉 , (14)
where the  operator denotes the entry-wise product of vectors.
Proof. Since the function F , the baseline input u and weight vectorw are fixed, we omit them from
IGF (x,u; w) and IGFi (x,u; w) for brevity. Consider the partial derivative ∂iF (u+α(x−u)) in
the definition (12) of IGi(x). For a given x, u and α, let v denote the vector u+α(x−u). Then
∂iF (v) = ∂F (v)/∂vi, and by applying the chain rule we get:
∂iF (v) :=
∂F (v)
∂vi
=
∂A(〈w, v〉)
∂vi
= A′(z)
∂〈w, v〉
∂vi
= wiA
′(z),
where A′(z) is the gradient of the activation A at z = 〈w, v〉. This implies that:
∂F (v)
∂α
=
d∑
i=1
(
∂F (v)
∂vi
∂vi
∂α
)
=
d∑
i=1
[wiA
′(z)(xi − ui)]
= 〈x−u, w〉A′(z)
We can therefore write
dF (v) = 〈x−u, w〉A′(z)dα,
and since 〈x−u, w〉 is a scalar, this yields
A′(z)dα =
dF (v)
〈x−u, w〉
Using this equation the integral in the definition of IGi(x) can be written as
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∫ 1
α=0
∂iF (v)dα =
∫ 1
α=0
wiA
′(z)dα
=
∫ 1
α=0
wi
dF (v)
〈x−u, w〉
=
wi
〈x−u, w〉
∫ 1
α=0
dF (v) (E.35)
=
wi
〈x−u, w〉 [F (x)− F (u)],
where (E.35) follows from the fact that (x−u) and w do not depend on α. Therefore from the
definition (12) of IGi(x):
IGi(x) = [F (x)− F (u)] (xi − ui)wi〈x−u, w〉 ,
and this yields the expression (14) for IG(x).
Appendix F Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem 5.1 (Equivalence of Stable IG and Adversarial Robustness). For loss functions L(x, y;w)
satisfying Assumption LOSS-CVX, the augmented loss inside the expectation (16) equals the `∞(ε)-
adversarial loss inside the expectation (2), i.e.
L(x, y;w) + max
||x′−x ||∞≤ε
|| IGLy (x,x′; w)||1 = max||δ||∞≤εL(x+δ, y;w) (17)
Proof. Recall that Assumption LOSS-CVX implies L(x, y;w) = g(−y〈w, x〉) for some non-
decreasing, differentiable, convex function g. Due to this special form of L(x, y;w), the function Ly
is a differential function of 〈w, x〉, and by Lemma 4.1 the i’th component of the IG term in (17) is
IG
Ly
i (x,x
′; w) =
wi(x
′−x)i
〈w,x′−x〉 ·
(
g(−y〈w,x′〉)− g(−y〈w,x〉), )
and if we let ∆ = x′−x (which satisfies that ‖∆‖∞ ≤ ε), its absolute value can be written as∣∣g(−y〈w,x〉 − y〈w,∆〉) − g(−y〈w,x〉)∣∣
|〈w,∆〉| · |wi ∆i|
Let z = −y〈w,x〉 and δ = −y〈w,∆〉, this is further simplified as |g(z+δ)−g(z)||δ| |wi∆i|. By Assump-
tion LOSS-CVX, g is convex, and therefore the "chord slope" [g(z + δ)− g(z)]/δ cannot decrease
as δ is increased. In particular to maximize the `1-norm of the IG term in Eq (17), we can set δ
to be largest possible value subject to the constraint ||∆||∞ ≤ ε, and we achieve this by setting
∆i = −y sgn(wi)ε, for each dimension i. This yields δ = ‖w ‖1ε, and the second term on the LHS
of (17) becomes
|g(z + δ)− g(z)| ·
∑
i |wi ∆i|
|δ| = |g(z + ε‖w ‖1)− g(z)| ·
∑
i |wi |ε
‖w ‖1ε
= |g(z + ε‖w ‖1)− g(z)|
= g(z + ε‖w ‖1)− g(z)
where the last equality follows because g is nondecreasing. Since L(x, y;w) = g(z) by Assumption
LOSS-CVX, the LHS of (17) simplifies to
g(−y〈w,x〉+ ε‖w ‖1),
and by Eq. (5), this is exactly the `∞(ε)-adversarial loss on the RHS of (17).
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Appendix G Aggregate IG Attribution over a Dataset.
Recall that in Section 4 we defined IGF (x,u; w) in Eq. (12) for a single input x (relative to a
baseline input u). This gives us a sense of the "importance" of each input feature in explaining
a specific model prediction F (x). Now we describe some ways to produce aggregate importance
metrics over an entire dataset. For brevity let us simply write IG(x) and IGi(x) and omit F,u andw
since these are all fixed for a given model and a given dataset.
Note that in Eq. 12, x is assumed to be an input vector in "exploded" space, i.e., all categorical
features are (explicitly or implicitly) one-hot encoded, and i is the position-index corresponding
to either a specific numerical feature, or a categorical feature-value. Note that if i corresponds to
a categorical feature-value, then for any input x where xi = 0 (i.e. the corresponding categorical
feature-value is not "active" for that input), IGi(x) = 0. A natural definition of the overall importance
of a feature (or feature-value) i for a given model F and dataset D, is the average of | IGi(x)| over
all inputs x ∈ D, which we refer to as the Feature Value Impact FVi[D]. For a categorical feature
with m possible values, we can further define its Feature-Impact (FI) as the sum of |FVi[D]| over
all i corresponding to possible values of this categorical feature.
The FI metric is particularly useful to gain an understanding of the aggregate importance of high-
cardinality categorical features. For example we measure the feature-concentration of models trained
on the MediaMath datasets (which have categorical features with cardinalities in the 100,000 range)
in terms of the FI metric (see the FIL1 and FI1P metrics in Section H).
Appendix H Experiments on Real Datasets: Model Training and Evaluation
Methodology
We describe here the common aspects of the training and evaluation methodology for the UCI and
MediaMath datasets. Any variations specific to the datasets are described in the respective subsections.
All the tasks we consider are binary probability prediction tasks, where the prediction target is a
binary label y ∈ {±1}, and the model output should be interpreted as the predicted probability that
y = 1. (The specific implementations may actually use a 0/1 label instead, but we keep the -1/1
description here as it simplifies some of the analytical expressions). Our code is implemented in
Python using the high-level TensorFlow Estimators and Dataset APIs.
It is important to note that all categorical variables are 1-hot encoded prior to being fed to the model-
training and evaluation code. In other words when we apply the `∞(ε)-adversarial perturbation (5) to
the input vector x, x represents the "flattened" feature-vector, i.e., all categorical features are 1-hot
encoded 5 A reasonable question is whether such perturbations are semantically meaningful, and
whether they represent legitimate perturbations by an adversary. One could also make the argument
that a real adversary would only be able to perturb the original input vector, and so the set of allowed
perturbations of x should be restricted to legitimate 1-hot encodings. Indeed some authors have
considered this type of restriction in the domain of malware detection [33]. We set aside this issue in
this paper, since our interest is more in the model-concentration effect of adversarial training, and
less in robustness to real attacks.
Each dataset is divided into train and test subsets. For training on natural examples we use the FTRL
optimizer in TensorFlow with `1-regularization strength (λ) set to 0. (We vary the λ to evaluate the
effect of `1-regularization). Our results are substantially the same regardless of which optimizer we
use, e.g. Adam, AdaGrad or simple SGD. We use FTRL mainly because in TensorFlow the FTRL
optimizer has an optional λ argument that controls the strength of `1-regularization. Although our
results are qualitatively similar with other optimizers, the best results are obtained using the FTRL
optimizer. All model weights are initialized to zero in case of the toy UCI datasets, whereas they are
initialized using a Gaussian initializer (with mean 0 and variance 0.001) in the case of the MediaMath
ad response-prediction models. Once again our results remain the same whether we use zero or
Gaussian initializers. For `∞(ε)-adversarial training we also use the FTRL optimizer, except that in
each mini-batch the examples x are perturbed according to the worst-case perturbation given by Eq.
(5).
5In practice we use feature-hashing when the cardinality of a categorical feature is large, but this is an
implementation detail, and we can conceptually think of the feature as having been explicitly 1-hot encoded
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Once a model is trained (adversarially or naturally) we compute two types of metrics:
• An ML performance metric, the AUC-ROC (Area Under the ROC Curve) on the held-out
natural test dataset.
• A few feature concentration metrics, defined as follows, where the linear model weight-
vector is w ∈ Rd (and d is the dimension of the exploded feature-space, i.e. after 1-hot
encoding).
WL1: ||w||1/||w||∞, which is a measure of the overall magnitude of the weights, scaled by
the biggest absolute weight. Note that if we multiply all weights by a constant factor,
then WtsL1 does not change.
W1P: The percent of the weights in w whose absolute value is at least 1% of the maximum
absolute weight. This can be thought of as a measure of how many feature-weights are
"significant", where the threshold of significance is 1% of the biggest absolute weight.
FIL1: ||FI||1/||FI||∞, where FI stands for the vector of Feature Impact values FIi[D]
(defined in Sec. G), and i ranges over the dimensions in the original feature-space (i.e.
before 1-hot encoding), and the dataset D is the natural training dataset.
FI1P: The percent of components of FI (which are all positive by definition) that are at
least 1% of the biggest component of FI , again over the natural training dataset.
In all cases the baseline vector u in all IG computations (using (12)) is the all-zeros vector. In the
various tables of results, we use the abbreviation nat to refer to metrics for the naturally-trained
model, and adv to refer to metrics for the adversarially-trained model.
Appendix I Experiments on some UCI datasets
We now describe experiments on datasets in the popular UCI repository of ML datasets. We show
details of experiments on two of these datasets:
• The mushroom dataset consists of 8142 instances, each of which corresponds to a different
mushroom species, and has 22 categorical features (and no numerical features), whose
cardinalities are all under 10. The task is to classify an instance as edible (label=1) or not
(label=0).
• The spambase dataset consists of 4601 instances with 57 numerical attributes (and no
categorical ones). The instances are various numerical features of a specific email, and the
task is classify the email as spam (label = 1) or not (label = 0).
In each case our training and testing methodology is the following: we split the dataset randomly into
a 70% training dataset and a 30% test dataset. We train a logistic model using the FTRL optimizer
(where the strength λ of `1 regularization can be adjusted), with all weights initialized to zero. Prior
to training and testing, we standardize each numerical feature using its mean and standard deviation
in the training dataset. For adversarial training we assume each input x is perturbed by an adversary
who is allowed to shift x by a vector δ whose `∞-norm is bounded by ε. In particular for a given ε
we use the closed-form worst-case perturbation formula in Eq. (5), and we set the `1 regularization
parameter λ to 0.
I.1 Mushroom Dataset
In Figure I.2 we show how varying the ε bound on an `∞ adversary impacts the weight-concentration
(measured by W1P, defined in Section H) and the AUC, in order to demonstrate that there is a range
of ε values that represents a "goldilocks" zone where there is a significant feature-concentration effect
while maintaining the (test-set) AUC within 0.01 of the naturally-trained AUC. With adversarial
training using ε = 1.6 the W1P value is only 12% (compared to almost 97% for a naturally-trained
model) while AUC (on natural test data) is 0.99, a drop of only 0.01 compared to a naturally trained
model.
We show in Figure I.3 how varying the `1-regularization strength parameter λ impacts AUC and
W1P (in natural training, i.e. ε = 0). The figure shows that the highest λ value that maintains an
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Figure I.2: Variation of W1P and test AUC with increasing ε bound on `∞ perturbations in adversarial training,
for the mushroom dataset. Note that ε = 0 corresponds to natural training, which results in AUC=1.00. The
horizontal green band from AUC=0.99 to AUC=1.00 shows the range of AUCs within 0.01 of AUC of the
naturally-trained mode. The blue vertical band represents the goldilocks zone of ε values (roughly 1.25 to 1.6)
that are high enough to produce significant model-concentration, yet low enough that AUC is maintained within
the green band.
Figure I.3: Variation of W1P and test AUC for naturally-trained models, with increasing `1-regularization
parameter λ. Even with a λ = 600, the W1P concentration metric is around 18%, considerably higher than the
12% achieved with adversarial training.
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AUC above 0.99 is 600, yet it achieves a W1P of around 18%, still significantly higher than the 12%
achieved with adversarial training using ε = 1.6.
We now want to show the contrast between the weights learned by natural training and adversarial
training with ε = 1.6. Since all features in this dataset are categorical, many with cardinalities close
to 10, there are too many features in the "exploded" space to allow a clean display, so we instead look
at the aggregate Feature Impact (FI) over the natural training dataset, see Figure I.4. It is worth noting
that several features that have a significant impact on the naturally-trained model have essentially
no impact on the adversarially trained model. Figures I.5 and I.6 show the drop-off curves of the
feature-weights and FI metrics respectively, and once again it is evident that the drop offs are much
steeper with adversarial training compared to natural training.
Figure I.4: Comparison of aggregate Feature Impact (FI) for a naturally-trained model, and an adversarially-
trained model with ε = 1.6, on the mushroom dataset. The features are arranged left to right in decreasing order
of the FI value in the naturally-trained model.
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Figure I.5: Comparison of drop-off of absolute feature weights in natural and adversarial training, on the
mushroom dataset. In each curve, a point (p, w) indicates that p percent of the absolute weights are larger than
w. Both curves are truncated when the absolute weight reaches 1% of the highest absolute weight in the model.
The adversarially trained model has a much steeper absolute weight drop-off, with only 12% being above the 1%
threshold, compared to 95% with natural training.
Figure I.6: Comparison of drop-off of aggregate Feature Impact FI (measured over the natural training dataset)
resulting from natural and adversarial training, for the mushroom dataset. In each curve, a point (p, w) indicates
that p percent of the FI values are larger than w. Both curves are truncated when the FI reaches 1% of the highest
FI in the model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper FI drop-off, with only 36% being above the
1% threshold, compared to 90% with natural training.
I.2 Spambase dataset
As with the mushroom dataset, we start by looking at the impact of varying ε (the adversarial
`∞ bound) on the concentration metric W1P, see Figure I.7. From the chart it is apparent that an
adversarially trained model ε = 0.6 achieves a concentration metric W1P of around 53% (meaning
that 53% of the model’s absolute weights are within 1% of the biggest absolute weight), compared to
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96% for a naturally-trained model, and yet yields an AUC (on natural test data) of 0.964, which is no
more than 0.01 worse than the AUC of 0.974 for a naturally-trained model.
Figure I.7: Variation of W1P and natural test AUC with increasing ε bound on `∞ perturbations in adversarial
training, for the spambase dataset. Note that ε = 0 corresponds to natural training, which results in AUC=0.974.
The horizontal green band from AUC=0.964 to AUC=0.974 shows the range of AUCs within 0.01 of AUC of the
naturally-trained mode. The blue vertical band represents the range of ε values (0.4 to 0.6) that are high enough
to produce significant model-concentration, yet low enough that AUC is maintained within the green band.
Figure I.8 shows that this tradeoff between model-concentration and AUC cannot be achieved by
using `1-regularization.
Figure I.8: Variation of W1P and natural test AUC for naturally-trained models, with increasing `1-
regularization parameter λ, for the spambase dataset. Even with a λ = 200, the W1P concentration metric is as
high as 80% (significantly worse than the 53% for adversarial training), and any higher value of λ pushes the
AUC to a level worse than 0.01 below the naturally-trained AUC with no regularization.
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We now fix ε = 0.6 for adversarial training and show in Figures I.9 and I.10 the bar-plots comparing
the weights and Feature-Impacts (FI) respectively, between naturally-trained and adversarially-trained
models. Since all features are numerical the number of weights is the same as the number of FIs.
However the distribution of the FIs does not follow that of the weights.
Figure I.9: Comparison of absolute model weights for a naturally-trained model, and an adversarially-trained
model with ε = 0.6, on the spambase dataset. The features are arranged left to right in decreasing order of their
absolute weight in the naturally-trained model. To avoid clutter, we show only features that have an absolute
weight at least 8% of the highest weight (across both models). (The features in this figure and the next are
identified by integers.)
Figure I.10: Comparison of aggregate Feature Impact (FI) for a naturally-trained model, and an adversarially-
trained model with ε = 0.6, on the spambase dataset. The features are arranged left to right in decreasing order
of their FI in the naturally-trained model. To avoid clutter, we show only features that have an FI at least 5% of
the highest FI (across both models).
Figures I.11 and I.12 contrast the drop-off curves of feature-weights and Feature Impacts (FI)
respectively between naturally-trained and adversarially-trained models.
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Figure I.11: Comparison of drop-off of absolute feature weights in natural and adversarial training, for the
spambase dataset. In each curve, a point (p, w) indicates that p percent of the absolute weights are larger than w.
Both curves are truncated when the absolute weight reaches 1% of the highest absolute weight in the model. The
adversarially trained model has a much steeper absolute weight drop-off, with only 52% being above the 1%
threshold, compared to 96% with natural training.
Figure I.12: Comparison of drop-off of aggregate Feature Impact (FI) (computed over the natural training
dataset) for a naturally-trained and adversarially-trained model. In each curve, a point (p, w) indicates that p
percent of the FI values are larger than w. Both curves are truncated when the FI reaches 1% of the highest FI in
the model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper FI drop-off, with only 52% being above the 1%
threshold, compared to 96% with natural training.
Appendix J Experiments with MediaMath Datasets: Ad Conversion
Prediction
MediaMath provides a software platform that operates a real-time bidding (RTB) engine which
responds to bid-opportunities sent by ad-exchanges. The RTB engine bids on behalf of advertisers
who set up ad-campaigns on the platform. A key component in determining bid prices is a prediction
of the probability that a consumer exposed to the advertiser’s campaign would subsequently perform
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a certain designated action (called a "conversion"). MediaMath currently trains a logistic regression
model for each campaign to generate these conversion probability predictions. The models are trained
on a dataset collected over a number of days, where each record contains various features related to
the ad opportunity (such as device type, browser, location, time of day etc), as well as a 0/1 label
indicating whether or not a conversion occurred subsequent to ad exposure. The model for each
campaign is trained on a sequence of 18 days of data, and validated/tested on the subsequent 3
days of data. The total number of records in each dataset can range from half million to 50 million
depending on the campaign. Each record has around 100 features, mostly categorical, and some (such
as "siteID") have cardinalities as high as 100,000, and so the dimension of the exploded feature-space
(i.e. after 1-hot encoding) is on the order of 400,000. (We use feature-hashing rather than explicit
1-hot encoding to map some of the high-cardinality features to a lower-dimensional vector, but the
net effect is similar to 1-hot encoding, except that now each dimension in the 1-hot encoding vector
may correspond to multiple features, due to hash collisions)
Given the extremely high dimensionality of the exploded feature-space, it is of considerable practical
importance to understand which features have a truly significant impact on the predictions. Specifi-
cally, we wish to explore whether adversarial training can yield models that have significantly better
feature concentration, while maintaining the AUC within say 0.01 of the naturally-trained model.
We have seen strong evidence that this is indeed possible, on the UCI datasets (Section I). We show
below that we see a similar phenomenon in the conversion-prediction models.
To study the impact of `∞(ε) adversarial training, we performed experiments with a wide range of
values of ε and found that for most campaigns, adversarial training with ε = 0.01 or ε = 0.001 results
in feature-concentrations significantly better than with natural training, while maintaining AUC (on
the validation set) within 0.01 of the AUC of a naturally-trained model. We also experimented with
keeping ε = 0 and varying the `1-regularization parameter λ in the FTRL optimizer, and found that
any λ > 0.2 significantly lowers the AUC of the resulting model, and lower λ values do not yield
a feature-concentration as strong as that achieved by adversarial training. Indeed we find that the
effects of adversarial training and `1 regularization are complementary: when an appropriate value of
ε is used in conjunction with say λ = 0.01, we find that `1 regularization helps to "clean" up the very
low feature-weights produced by adversarial training by pushing them to zero.
Table J.1 shows a summary of results on 9 campaigns 6. In some cases the AUC of the adversarially-
trained model is better than that of the naturally-trained model. Recall that the W1P metric measures
what percent of dimensions (in the exploded space, after 1-hot encoding) have absolute weights at
least 1 percent of the highest absolute weight. Since most features are categorical, W1P is therefore a
measure of what percent of feature-values are significant to the model. This metric (as well as WL1)
falls drastically with adversarial training in all cases, which indicates that several of the feature-values
are simply not relevant to predicting the label. There is thus a potentially massive model-compression
that can be done, and this can have benefits in storing, updating and serving models (MediaMath
periodically trains around 40,000 models). Table J.1 also shows the FI1P and FIL1 metrics, which
are aggregate feature-impact concentration metrics over the natural training dataset. Note that these
are at the feature level and not feature-value level. Since the FI measure of a categorical feature
aggregates the FVI metric over all values of this feature, the drop in this metric (when we go from
natural to adversarial training) is not as dramatic as in the case of WL1 or W1P (and sometimes these
are higher than with natural training).
6All campaign IDs and feature names are masked for client confidentiality reasons
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Campaign training AUC W1P WL1 FI1P FIL1
285 nat 0.560 12.93 165.05 0.78 5.80
adv (ε = 0.01) 0.556 0.39 13.27 0.37 2.87
479 nat 0.697 11.23 92.02 3.20 12.52
adv (ε = 0.001) 0.694 6.17 66.96 3.13 12.34
735 nat 0.758 12.20 220.97 1.87 21.82
adv (ε = 0.01) 0.765 0.51 21.02 0.75 16.36
622 nat 0.565 27.11 110.12 6.63 5.73
adv (ε = 0.01) 0.561 4.21 18.18 2.87 3.55
594 nat 0.702 16.91 172.55 0.86 12.54
adv (ε = 0.001) 0.702 1.09 19.97 0.77 11.19
473 nat 0.683 28.02 177.36 3.14 14.69
adv (ε = 0.001) 0.673 3.58 55.68 2.84 15.69
070 nat 0.622 18.53 158.15 4.94 26.21
adv (ε = 0.001) 0.625 7.55 107.63 4.46 24.00
645 nat 0.573 16.26 251.37 2.78 31.78
adv (ε = 0.01) 0.627 1.07 34.45 1.12 10.60
733 nat 0.658 27.35 203.73 4.04 11.36
adv (ε = 0.001) 0.667 9.91 108.03 4.13 11.60
Table J.1: Comparison of AUC and feature-concentration between natural and adversarial training on 9
advertising campaigns. The 4 concentration metrics are defined in Section H. Note that while the AUC is
computed on the natural validation set, the concentration metrics FI1P and FIL1 are computed on the natural
training dataset. In some campaigns, such as 285, 735 the W1P metric improves by a factor of more than 24.
To illustrate the effect of adversarial training in more detail, we focus on campaign number 735
(the bottom row in Table J.1) and compare the results from natural training and adversarial training
(with ε = 0.01). Figure J.13 compares the Feature Impact (FI) values between these models; Figure
J.14 compares the feature-weights drop-off curves of these models; and Figure J.15 compares the FI
drop-off curves.
Figure J.13: Comparison of aggregate Feature Impact (FI) for a naturally-trained model, and an adversarially-
trained model with ε = 0.01, on the dataset for Campaign 735. The features are arranged left to right in
decreasing order of their FI in the naturally-trained model.
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Figure J.14: Comparison of drop-off of absolute feature weights in natural and adversarial training (with
ε = 0.01), for Campaign 735. In each curve, a point (p, w) indicates that p percent of the absolute weights are
larger than w. Each curve is truncated when the absolute weight reaches 1% of the highest absolute weight in
the respective model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper absolute weight drop-off, with only
0.5% being above the 1% threshold, compared to 12% with natural training (this is consistent with Table J.1).
Figure J.15: Comparison of drop-off of aggregate Feature Impact (FI) (computed over the natural training
dataset) for a naturally-trained and adversarially-trained model (with ε = 0.01), for Campaign 735. In each
curve, a point (p, w) indicates that p percent of the FI values are larger than w. Each curve is truncated when the
FI reaches 1% of the highest FI in the respective model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper
FI drop-off, with only 0.75% being above the 1% threshold, compared to 1.87% with natural training. (this is
consistent with Table J.1).
Figures J.16 and J.17 contrast the ability of adversarial training and `1 regularization to improve
model concentration while maintaining AUC (on natural test data): adversarial training with ε0.01
improves the concentration metric W1P to as low as 0.5% (compared to 12% for a naturally trained
model, an improvement factor as high as 24), and yet achieves an AUC slightly higher than with
natural training. On the other hand with `1 regularization, using a strength of λ = 0.2 improves the
concentration to 5% (significantly worse than 0.5% for adversarial training) and slightly improves
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upon the naturally-trained AUC, but any higher value of λ significantly degrades the AUC, and the
W1P concentration metric does not go below 2.5%.
Figure J.16: Variation of W1P and natural test AUC with increasing ε bound on `∞ perturbations in adversarial
training, for campaign 735. Note that ε = 0 corresponds to natural training, which results in AUC=0.758.
The horizontal green band lower-bounded by AUC=0.748 represents the range of AUCs within 0.01 of AUC
of the naturally-trained mode. The blue vertical band represents the range of ε values (0.01 to 0.03) that are
high enough to produce significant model-concentration (i.e. reduction in W1P), yet low enough that AUC is
maintained within the green band. For these values of ε, the W1P metric is under 0.5%, meaning that only 0.5%
of absolute weights are within 1% of the highest absolute weight.
Figure J.17: Variation of W1P and natural test AUC for naturally-trained models, with increasing `1-
regularization parameter λ, for campaign 735. For a λ = 0.2, the W1P concentration metric is as high
as 5% (significantly worse than the 0.5% for adversarial training), and any higher value of λ significantly
degrades the AUC.
28
